We focus on syntactic aspects of di¤erential awareness that give rise to contractual disputes. Boundedly rational parties use a common language, but do not share a common understanding of the world, leading to ambiguity in both syntactic and semantic forms. In contractual relationships, ambiguity leads to disagreement and disputes. We show that the agents may prefer simpler less ambiguous contracts when facing potential disputes. In particular, parties may prefer liquidated damages provisions to contractual terms that specify a more complex risk allocation.
Introduction
Language is a matter of interpretation, and interpretations will di¤er. This fact is of fundamental importance in the construction of contracts, which are written or verbal agreements that the parties act in particular ways under particular conditions. For any contract to be successfully implemented, the parties must agree on whether the relevant conditions apply. A contract that is ambiguous, in the sense that parties may di¤er in their interpretation of the conditions that apply including the actions that are required, will lead to disputes and, ultimately, litigation.
To avoid disputes, parties to a contract may seek to avoid ambiguous terms, even when the resulting contract is incomplete, in the sense that opportunities for risk-sharing or productive cooperation are foregone. They might also include default clauses like liquidated damages in order to avoid further litigation fees incurred during ex post arguments over ambiguous terms.
E¢ ciency arguments for liquidated damages clauses appear in the economics literature as far back as Shavell (1980) , and are elaborated in Che and Chung (1999) . The e¢ ciency is obtained by considering e¤ects on the ex ante investment and default incentives of the parties. These papers treat risk neutral parties in the absence of ambiguity, so there is no contractual rationale for risk sharing or ambiguity aversion. Chung (1991) pointed out the di¢ culty of simple contracts being e¢ cient when both parties are risk averse.
In contrast, we treat risk averse and ambiguity averse parties. Nevertheless, we …nd that liquidated damages contracts can be e¢ cient when coupled with ambiguity aversion. The source for the e¢ ciency of liquidated damages is their security against ex post disputes. Motivations for liquidated damages that are more in line with our approach appear in the legal literature. As argued by Hillman (2000, p. 732) :
"Because people do not like ambiguity, contracting parties may prefer the safety of a liquidated damages provision over the uncertainty of expectancy damages."
Similarly, Goetz and Scott (1977, p. 557) explain:
"The expected cost of establishing true losses under conventional damage measures will thus induce parties who face uncertain or unprovable anticipated losses to negotiate stipulated damage agreements."
We formally treat ambiguity as arising from di¤erent interpretations of the same syntactic expressions. Grant et al. (2012) gave a more semantic version of this type of ambiguity taking the dispute relations as primitives of the model used for decision making. In this paper, the logical language is the primitive and the dispute relations are derived from the linguistic description of the situation.
We adopt the syntactic decision theoretic approach of Blume et al. (2006) and adapt it to …t a two party contractual setting. The set of contingencies and the set of actions is expressible in a common language available to the two parties are taken as primitive. A contract is a set of conditional actions, built up using contingencies that can be expressed using the contractual terms available in the common language. We consider contracts between two parties using the same contractual language, but with possibly di¤erent interpretations of the contingencies speci…ed in the contract. We derive possibility of dispute relations that specify the pairs of contingencies over which the two players might be in dispute.
It is natural for a party to consider the range of outcomes that might arise given the ambiguity he or she perceives to be associated with the range of possible interpretations by the other party.
We show how this can give rise to preferences that may be represented by the "-contamination model commonly used to represent preferences averse to state-contingent ambiguity. Thus, our approach establishes a connection between aversion to syntactic or linguistic ambiguity (the sense in which the term 'ambiguity'is normally found in ordinary usage) and semantic or state-contingent ambiguity (the sense in which the term is commonly used in decision theory).
In the face of ambiguity, we consider the contractual speci…cation of damages to apply when one party is unable (or …nds it undesirable) to ful…l their contractual obligations. In particular, we consider 'liquidated damages'contracts which specify a constant payment for the case of default.
We are able to show in Proposition 4 that liquidated damages contracts are ex ante e¢ cient when the aversion to ambiguity is su¢ ciently high. In general, we observe a trade o¤ between risk sharing and ambiguity. When the aversion to ambiguity is small enough, the bene…ts of risk sharing dominate and more complete contracts are e¢ ciently chosen. When aversion to ambiguity is large, liquidated damages contracts are chosen. It is natural to ask whether the e¢ ciency of liquidated damages contracts obtains in the standard state-space approach. We show in Proposition 5 that it does not.
The e¢ ciency of liquidated damages contracts in our model rests on the aversion to ambiguity being su¢ ciently pronounced to induce the parties to forgo risk sharing opportunities in default states. In general, however, e¢ cient contracts exploit risk sharing opportunities in non-default states.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set up a formal test-based language in which contracts are speci…ed and derive a representation for preferences in the absence of ambiguity. Next, in Section 3, we develop the concept of contractual ambiguity, and derive preferences over ambiguous contracts using an "-contamination model. In Section 4 we apply our model to give some results on liquidated damages contracts. In Section 5 we discuss the implications of our analysis and its relationship to the existing literature on incomplete contracts and bounded rationality.
Tests, actions and contracts
We consider two parties i = 1; 2. Following the approach of Blume et al. (2006) , we assume that both players have access to a non-empty set of primitive test propositions T 0 = ft 1 ; :::; t K g and a set of actions A 0 . Let T denote the closure of T 0 under conjunction (^) and negation (:). We use t _ t 0 as an abbreviation for :(:t^:t 0 ).
For the semantics, we follow Blume et al. (2006) and use a state space that is equivalent to their set of atoms over primitive tests. We set S i = S = f0; 1g K for i = 1; 2, with jSj = 2 K . Hence a state s is a vector of zeroes and ones (a binary number) where the k th component of s denotes the result of test t k in state s, with 0 (respectively, 1) corresponding to the result of the test is 'not true'(respectively, 'true'). We use r k (s) to denote the k th component of s.
For convenience we denote by s 0 the state (0; 0:::0), by s 1 the state (0; 0:::0; 1), by s 2 the state (0; 0; :::; 1; 0) and so on up to s [jSj 1] for the state (1; :::; 1):
test t is true. The state space S = f0; 1g K induces a test interpretation constructed as follows.
For each t k in T 0 , set (t k ) = fs 2 S : r k (s) = 1g. The test interpretation is then inductively extended to tests in T by the rule: for any t; t 0 2 T , (t^t 0 ) = (t) \ (t 0 ), and (:t) = S (t).
Conversely, each state s 2 S can be identi…ed with a test t(s) = t 1 (s)^:::^t K (s) 2 T de…ned as follows. For each k = 1; :::; K let:
:t k if r k (s) = 0:
By construction (t(s)) = fsg meaning the test t(s) is satis…ed only at the state s.
We are interested in the set of contracts C, which are constructed inductively from the set of actions A 0 and the set of tests T by taking the closure under the 'if-then-else'construction. That is, we take each a in A 0 to be a contract, and then we require, for any pair of contracts c and Conversely, for a given act f : S ! A 0 , we can de…ne the associated canonical contract c f with an exhaustive speci…cation given by
Consider now the individuals' 'ambiguity-free' preferences de…ned over the set of contracts C.
These should be interpreted as the players'preferences over contracts in the absence of any consideration of possible disputes. That is, these are the preferences each player would have, under the assumptions that the other party has the same understanding of the tests used to specify the contract, and that the contract is implemented according to this shared understanding. In the next section, we consider the possibility of a dispute arising from di¤erent interpretations of 'ambiguous'tests.
We assume these preferences admit a representation of the following form: there exists for each state s in S a continuous utility function u i s : A 0 ! R, such that the following additively-separable function represents the ambiguity-free preferences of individual i:
We show in the Appendix that the additive separability across states embodied in expression (1) arises by requiring the preferences to satisfy (along with some other standard properties) the analog of Savage's sure-thing principle. However, as is well-known (see for example Karni, 1985) , unless there is some exogenously given structure on the payo¤s and their utility, in this formulation, as far as the "ambiguity-free" preferences represented by U i (:) are concerned, one cannot separate the probability of the state obtaining from the state-dependent utility. One cannot even determine the level of state-dependent utility. More precisely, it is the only the change in the state-dependent utility resulting from a change in the action taken in that state that is determined up to a positive scalar. From expression (1) it follows that if u i s ( ) is a state-dependent utility can be used for the representation in (1) then so can any functionũ i s (a) = ũ i s (a) + s , with > 0. But notice that for any pair of actions a and a 0 and any pair of states s and s 0 , we have:
. We thus de…ne the following equivalence class for state-dependent utilities. In what follows, we shall restrict attention to individuals whose preferences in the absence of ambiguity admit a state-dependent expected utility representation of the form given in (1). We shall identify such a preference relation by its state-dependent expected utility representation.
De…nition 2 Let U denote the set of state-dependent expected utility functions de…ned on the set of contracts C that take the form given in (1).
Introducing Ambiguity
Because we have chosen formally identical state spaces for the players, the test interpretation of each player and the language of each player are identical. The distinction and the source of disputes thus arises from the interaction between syntax and semantics. Disputes arise from the players disagreeing about which tests have been satis…ed, or, in a semantic rendition, which state of nature applies. In this section we …rst introduce ambiguity by way of ambiguous tests and show how this makes some contracts 'ambiguous'. We then develop a model of ambiguity averse decision-makers.
Conclusive and ambiguous tests and contracts
In this section we introduce the notion of ambiguous tests. This notion will be based on a primitive notion of conclusiveness of a test. The idea of conclusiveness of a test t for an individual i with respect to individual (3 i) is that if she …nds herself in a position where she assesses that t is satis…ed, then she is sure that individual (3 i) will assess t as satis…ed also. The set of conclusive tests for individual i will be denoted by T i C . We presume that the individuals are mutually
The test t is unambiguous if it is conclusive for both individuals. The set of unambiguous tests for individuals 1 and 2 is denoted
To ensure that the sets of conclusive tests match our intuition, we assume that T 1 C and T 2 C exhibit the following properties.
Properties of Conclusive Tests: For any pair of tests t and t 0 in T : The next proposition shows that these properties guarantee that any test satis…ed in every state or in no state is unambiguous and also that the set of unambiguous tests is closed under negation and conjunction.
Proposition 1 Fix T 1 C and T 2 C . If T 1 C and T 2 C satisfy the properties of conclusive tests then for each pair of tests t and t 0 in T :
, it follows by property (iv) and the de…nition of an unambiguous test that t 2 T U : Next, let (t) = ?. Then, (:t) = S, so as just shown above using properties (i) and
(iv), the test :t is in T U . Then, by property (ii), the test ::t is in T i C for i = 1; 2, and so by the de…nition of an unambiguous test, the test ::t 2 T U . Noting that (t) = (::t), it follows from Given that the two individuals are mutually cognizant of T 1 C and T 2 C and that they satisfy the four properties listed above, it follows that for any contract of the form 'if t then a else a 0 ,'
if t is an unambiguous test then both individuals anticipate that they will agree whether or not test t has been satis…ed. Thus, they will agree whether or not the contract calls for action a or for action a 0 . Suppose, however, the test is conclusive only for individual i and is not conclusive for individual (3 i). Then i anticipates that, when she has assessed test t is satis…ed individual (3 i) will that agree the contract calls for action a: However, individual (3 i) believes when he has assessed test t is satis…ed, there may be a disagreement with i about whether the contract calls for action a or a 0 . Conversely, it follows from property (ii) that individual (3 i) anticipates that when he has assessed test t is not satis…ed, individual i will also have assessed that test t is not satis…ed and so will agree that the contract calls for action a 0 . Individual i, on the other hand, anticipates that when she has assessed that test t is not satis…ed there may be a disagreement with individual (3 i) about whether the contract calls for action a or a 0 .
We can use the test interpretation to derive the set of unambiguous events.
De…nition 3 The set of unambiguous events E U 2 S is given by:
The set of ambiguous events E A = 2 S E U .
Lemma 2 The set of unambiguous events E U is an algebra of subsets of S that contains S and ?. That is, it is closed under taking complements and intersection.
Proof. Assertion (i) of Proposition 1 implies that E U contains S and ?. Consider any pair of unambiguous events E and E 0 in E U . Since they are unambiguous events, there must exist tests t and t 0 in T U , such that (t) = E and (t 0 ) = E 0 . Assertion (ii) of Proposition 1 states that T U is closed under negation and conjunction, so the tests :t and t^t 0 are also in T U . Since 
By construction, the set D i (s) comprises those states that cannot be distinguished from s by a conclusive test for i being satis…ed. Clearly, s 2 D i (s) for each s 2 S, so D i (s) 6 = ? for each s 2 . We will refer to D i (s) s2S as the possibility of disputes for i.
For each s 2 S we can de…ne E(s), the smallest unambiguous event containing s; by
We have the following facts which shows that coarsest common-re…nement of D 1 (s) s2S [ Hence, there must be some E 2 fF 2 E U : s 2 F g, and s 0 = 2 E. Since E 2 E U , there is a test t 2 T U such that (t) = E. Also, s 2 E (s). Since s 0 2 D i (s), it follows from the de…nition of D i (s) that s 0 2 (t) = E, which is a contradiction. Hence, we conclude that D i (s) E(s).
Next we show that
is an unambiguous event containing s but not containing s 0 . Hence E(s) (t),and s 0 = 2 E(s), which is again a contradiction. Hence we conclude that E(s) D i (s). (Only-if) Since D i (s) = fsg, it follows that for each s 0 6 = s, there is a test t 0 2 T i U such that s 2 (t 0 ) and s 0 = 2 (t 0 ). Since T i C is closed under conjunction by assertion (ii) of Proposition 1, we can take the conjunction of these tests over S fsg to obtain a conclusive test for i, t 2 T i C that excludes everything but s, that is, (t ) = fsg. Since (t(s)) = fsg = (t ), it follows from
Notice that if a contract is measurable with respect to the unambiguous partition, E i (s) s2S
although the individuals might disagree about the actual state that has obtained, they will never disagree about which action the contract prescribes. Hence such contracts are viewed as unambiguous.
De…nition 5 A contract is unambiguous if for all for all s,
We denote by C U the set of unambiguous contracts.
Preferences under ambiguity
We now develop a model the e¤ects of ambiguity has on preferences over contracts. Consider an individual i whose preferences over contracts, in the absence of ambiguity, admit a representation U i 2 U. When individual i believes that the state is s, she considers it possible that the other party may believe any element of D i (s) has obtained. Hence in terms of a given contract c, this possibility of dispute generates ambiguity about the action that will actually be implemented.
Depending upon which interpretation is followed, the action might conceivably be any member of the set ff c (s 0 ) : s 0 2 D i (s)g.
We assume that individuals anticipate that a dispute will lead to a 'war of attrition'game in which each player's equilibrium payo¤ is equal to their security, in this case, the outcome associated with the other player's interpretation. 2 That is, if player i sees state s and (3 i) sees s 0 then player i's expected payo¤ in the war-of-attrition equilibrium is min u i s (f c (s)) ; u i s (f c (s 0 )) . If the dispute set D (s) contains only two elements, then the player can evaluate the result of a dispute directly.
More generally, given that disputes are resolved by a war of attrition, individual i can do no worse than accept the least favorable action implied by the contract in the set of possible interpretations of the tests by (3 i) at s, that is, in the set ff c (s 0 ) : s 0 2 D i (s)g.
Hence, one possible way to model the potential loss from a dispute and the resulting war of attrition is to assign a decision weight to this worst-case outcome. This reasoning corresponds to one of the most commonly applied models of ambiguity averse preferences, the "-contamination model. 3
If we let " i s be the decision-weight she assigns to the ambiguity she faces in state s, then her "-contaminated subjective expected utility V i s (c) of contract c in state s is given by
In what follows, we refer to an increase in " i s as a greater aversion of i to ambiguity in state s. We let V i (c) = P 
Liquidated damages
To be e¤ective, a contract must specify some sanction to be applied if one or other party fails to perform their obligations. In some cases, this is a relatively simple matter: failure to perform may be held to nullify the contract. In other cases, however, failure by one party to perform an obligation may cause damage to the other.
For concreteness, let us consider an example where a supplier contracts with a builder to deliver materials on a given date. However, under certain conditions (expressed as tests), the supplier may be unable to deliver, and may default, declaring force majeure. Failure to deliver on time may force the builder to source the supplies elsewhere at high cost, or to delay the project.
Thus, neither nullifying the contract nor requiring (delayed) performance is an adequate remedy. 3 The approach here can viewed as a state-dependent extension of Kopylov (2008) .
The costs of failure will depend on a variety of factors, which may be represented by tests. For example, rainy weather might halt construction with the result that the supplier's default causes no additional cost. In other cases, the default may occur at a crucial point in the project, creating unusually large damages.
In the absence of bounds on rationality, the parties could agree on a contract that listed all possible default states, and speci…ed a payment to be made in each case. The bargaining solution in this case, derived from the state-dependent preferences of both parties, will be referred to as the …rst best. However, with ambiguity arising from bounded rationality, the …rst best may not be attainable.
One solution is for the contract to specify that the defaulting party should compensate the other party to an amount depending on the amount of their loss. In the event of a dispute over the magnitude of the loss, a court or other external arbiter will determine the payment.
Another possibility is that of liquidated damages, in which the payment for a speci…c breach is …xed in the contract, without reference to the actual losses su¤ered by the injured party. We will look at the liquidated damages setting and give some results on when liquidated damages contracts are e¢ cient.
We begin by assuming that the test set T 0 includes the test t d , interpreted as 'the state is such that party 1 must default'and a set of testsT T , that are relevant to the contract in the absence of default. We assume that t d is unambiguous and that the members of the set of testsT T , are also unambiguous. That is, the only potential disputes relate to the consequences of default, and not to the question of whether party 1 has in fact defaulted. Without loss of generality we take t d = t K , hence the default event t d = fs 2 S : r K (s) = 1g. That is, the contract speci…es a set of actions to be performed, and payments to be made, in the absence of default and a set of payments to be made in the presence of default. The payment y c (s) for any s 2 (t K ) (that is, a payment made in the presence of default) is referred to as a damages payment.
The action set
We further assume that, for each party i = 1; 2 in each default state s 2 (t K ), the preferences over (â; y) are quasi-linear with respect to the damages payment and so the utility in each state may be expressed in the form
where v i s is a state-dependent utility function over wealth, assumed strictly increasing ( v 1 s 0 > 0) and strictly concave ( v 1 s 00 < 0), and w i s (â) is the monetary equivalent value to party i of the actionâ performed in state s.
Notice that for any default state s 2 (t K ), (s K ; 0) = (s 1 ; s 2 ; :::; s K 1 ; 0) is the state that would have obtained if party 1 had not defaulted with all the results of all other basic test in T 0 unchanged. In this counter-factual state, the contract would have called for action a c (s K ; 0).
Hence, w i s (a c (s K ; 0)) w i s (a 0 ) may be interpreted as the loss incurred by party i in state s, as a consequence of the default.
In the absence of ambiguity, a Pareto optimal contract c must satisfy the Borsch condition for e¢ cient risk-sharing, that is, the marginal rate of substitution between any pair of statecontingent payo¤s must be the same for both individuals. Formally, for any pair of default states
s)) A contract satisfying this condition will be referred to as a …rst-best contract. Since the contract is unambiguous in the absence of default, the …rst-best contract will, in general, be unambiguous if and only if the set of unambiguous tests is rich enough to distinguish any pair of states s;s 2 (t K ) such that either w 1 s (a 0 ) 6 = w 1 s (a 0 ) or w 2 s (a 0 ) 6 = w 2 s (a 0 ) :
Suppose, however, that tests relevant to the e¤ects of default on the welfare of party 1 (the defaulting party) are ambiguous.
In this case, we may consider the case of a contract with damages dependent on losses to party 2. Since the cardinality of (t K ) is …nite it follows that the set
is also …nite. Moreover, for each`2 L 2 , there exists a test t`2 T that is satis…ed if and only if default occurs, and the associated loss for party 2 is`, that is, on the event (t`) = (t K ) \ s : w 2 s (a c (s K ; 0)) w 2 s (a 0 ) =` . The members of the set of events (t`) :`2 L 2 [ f (:t K )g, are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and therefore constitute a partition of the state space. Any contract c can be amended in a way to make it a loss-dependent damages contractĉ, by restricting it to be measurable with respect to this partition. That is,ĉ may then be speci…ed as
where yĉ : R + ! [0; M ] is a function relating the loss borne by party 2 to the associated damages payment from party 1. Note that we do not require yĉ (`) =`. That is, the damages payment from party 1 to party 2 need not be equal to the loss incurred by party 2. Depending on the risksharing properties of the contract and on the state-dependent preferences of party 1, the damages payment to party 2, yĉ (`), may be less than, equal to or greater than the loss`incurred by party
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The tests t`may still be ambiguous. For example, the parties may disagree over what items should be counted as losses arising from default and how they should be valued. Thus, such contracts are likely to, and regularly do, produce disputes.
If losses are ambiguous, and dispute costs are high, parties may prefer a liquidated damages 4 In general, risk-sharing would imply that the damages payment should be less than the loss. In the model presented here, losses are the result of force majeure rather than discretionary options. Hence, there is no incentivebased reason for exemplary or punitive damages. However, consideration of the state-contingent preferences of party 1 suggests instances where risk-sharing may imply a payment larger than the loss. Suppose that high-losses to party 2 occur when the good is in high demand and subject to constrained supply. Then party 1, having defaulted as a result of inability to supply on time may be able to sell the good at a high price and therefore (involuntarily) bene…t from default. contract, with a speci…ed payment y. The required test set is then the minimal set ft K g and the contract simply requires
That is, either the contract applicable in the absence of default is implemented or the default action a 0 is undertaken and party 1 pays to party 2 the liquidated damage sum y. As long as the test t K is unambiguous, so is the liquidated damages contract.
In general, there will be gains from risk sharing across states. When the aversion to ambiguity is small across states, e¢ cient contracts will involve risk sharing even at the ambiguous default states. However, when the aversion to ambiguity is su¢ ciently large, there will be no risk sharing across default states, i.e., all e¢ cient contracts will be liquidated damages contracts. We formally give this result in the next proposition. For simplicity, we presume that the possibility of dispute set D i (s) is the same for each default state s 2 (t K ).
Proposition 4 Suppose that for i = 1; 2 and all s 2 (t K ), D i (s) = (t K ). There is an " < 1 such that: if " i s > " for all i 2 f1; 2g and s 2 (t K ), then every ex ante e¢ cient contract is a liquidated damages contract.
Proof. Suppose a contract c is not a liquidated damages contract. Then, let y denote the maximal payment over default states under this contract, i.e., y = max
y c (s), and let y denote the minimal payment over default states, i.e., y = min
y c (s). Then, y > y. We will show that provided " is large enough, we can increase the welfare of both parties 1 and 2 by marginally increasing y and marginally decreasing y.
For, this, we de…ne:
By assumption that (v 1 s ) 0 > 0, and (v 1 s ) 00 < 0 it follows that a > b > 0. We presume in what follows that: " i s > " for all i 2 f1; 2g and s 2 (t K ). Let S = fs 2 (t K ) : y = y c (s)g, S = fs 2 (t K ) : y = y c (s)g, and S = (t K ) (S [ S). Then the ex ante expect utility of 1 can be written as:
We consider a marginal change to y and y such that dy = dy > 0. For such a change:
We let jAj denote the cardinality of a set A. By our choices of a; b and ", and the facts that
(v 1 s ) 0 > 0, and (v 1 s ) 00 < 0, we …nd that:
By similar reasoning for 2, we obtain dV 2 (c) > 0. Hence, c cannot be ex ante e¢ cient.
Here we see that in the case of su¢ cient aversion to ambiguity over default states, the optimal contract is the liquidated damages contract. The intuition in the maximally pessimistic case is as follows. Since each expects the worst in default states, we can raise the utility of 2 at all default states by raising y, and simultaneously raise the utility of 1 at all default states by lowering y.
Since this change does not a¤ect utility in any other state, it generates a Pareto improvement.
Proposition 4 shows that intuition carries through provided the parties are su¢ ciently ambiguity averse.
The optimality of the liquidated damages contract is consistent with situations where the parties expect default to result in ex post litigation costs that burn up all surplus. By signing a liquidated damages contract, each party commits ex ante to abstain from such behavior.
A natural question is whether or not the e¢ ciency of liquidated damages contracts can be maintained in a state space approach. The answer is that it cannot. To see this, we presume that each player will have a partition over S S and a probability distribution over those states.
Let i (s; t) denote the prior probability in i 0 s mind that 1 sees s and 2 sees t. We focus on the event of default which is E d = f(s; t) : s; t 2 (t K )g. Then, the probability of a default event in the eyes of i is P (s;t)2E d i (s; t). In keeping with our previous analysis, each person's utility and wealth depends only on the state they see so when the state is (s; t) we will write v 1
However, we allow the transfer amount y to depend on the state (s; t). The presumption here is that some determination on (s; t) will be made ex post and then a transfer occurs. Each player considers each contingency (s; t) as possible when he writes the contract. Under this scenario, the ex ante expected utility of 1 and 2 restricted to default states are respectively:
and: X
Though typically liquidated damages will not be e¢ cient in this full state-space approach, for a clean result we focus on a case of a common utility function and common prior with a technical assumption about richness of the state-space:
3. (Richness of State-space) There are s; s 0 in (t K ) such that either w 1 s (a 0 ) 6 = w 1 t (a 0 ) or w 2 s (a 0 ) 6 = w 2 t (a 0 ).
Proposition 5 Suppose that 1-3 hold. If c is ex ante e¢ cient, then c is not a liquidated damages contract.
Proof. Suppose c is a liquidated damages contract. By assumption 3, there are two default states s and s 0 where some player gets a di¤erent utility prior to any transfer. We presume, without loss of generality that w 1 s (a 0 ) 6 = w 1 s 0 (a 0 ). Consider the states (s; s) and (s 0 ; s) which are both in E d . By assumptions 1 and 2, a necessary condition for e¢ ciency is:
Since the contract is a liquidated damages contract, y c (s; s) = y c (s 0 ; s), and so the right hand side of the equality must be 1. However, since w 1 s (a 0 ) 6 = w 1 s 0 (a 0 ) and v 00 < 0 (strict concavity), the left hand side cannot equal 1 when y c (s; s) = y c (s 0 ; s). Since c does not satisfy the necessary condition for e¢ ciency, c is not e¢ cient.
Concluding comments
We have provided a formal model for incorporating linguistic ambiguity into decision making. The ambiguity in our model arises from the bounded rationality of the players which is expressed as limited abilities to perform tests over the possible contingencies. As a result, players have limited descriptions of the possible states of the world available to them. Even when they use the same language, their interpretations may di¤er.
Contracting is modelled using a multi-player version of the test-based contingent plans described in Blume et al. (2006) . In this context, ambiguity can a¤ect incentives for risk sharing, and the desirability of contracts. In particular, ambiguity may in some cases be handled e¤ectively and e¢ ciently by liquidated damages contracts.
The representation of ambiguity proposed here suggests new approaches to a range of issues in contract theory, and potentially broader applications in agency theory. The standard principalagent problem is one where contracting is limited to some observable unambiguous characteristics like output, rather than a full set of characteristics including e¤ort levels which may be ambiguous.
The framework developed here suggests the possibility of an endogenous choice between contracts over di¤erent characteristics, where the choice of the contractual variables chosen depends on the level of ambiguity and potential gains from risk sharing. While this application would require overcoming some new technical details involving the appropriate treatment of tests, the bene…t would be the development of a theory of contracting in which the terms of the contract, over which the parties actually bargain, plays the central role.
Sure-thing Principle: For any four contracts c; c 0 ; c 00 and c 000 in C, and any test t in T , if t then c else c 00 % i if t then c 0 else c 00 ) if t then c else c 000 % i if t then c 0 else c 000 .
The …rst axiom is the standard ordering axiom. The second requires any two contracts that induce the same act over actions must come from the same indi¤erence class. This seems natural in a setting in which we assume the agent understands the language in which contracts are written and the logical implications of its terms and attendant requirements. The third axiom is the analog of Savage's sure-thing principle.
The fourth axiom is a continuity assumption to ensure a numerical representation of preferences exists. Before stating it, we need to de…ne what it means for a sequence of contracts to converge to a limit. We do this inductively. First, we de…ne the notion of convergence for constant acts directly from the notion of convergence of actions in the set A 0 , and then we extend it inductively to all contracts via the 'if..then..else'construction.
De…nition 6 (Convergence of Sequences of Contracts) The (countably in…nite) sequence of constant acts ha n i converges to the constant act a, if the corresponding sequence of actions converge to the corresponding action, that is, lim n!1 a n = a. For any sequence of tests ht n i and any pair of sequences of contracts hc n i and hc 0 n i, the sequence of contracts hc 00 n i, where c 00 n = 'if t n then c n else c 0 n ' is said to converge to c 00 = if t then c else c 0 , if hc n i and hc 0 n i converge to c and c 0 , respectively, and there exists …nite m, such that t n = t for all n > m.
Continuity of preference can now be expressed in the standard manner of requiring that there are no 'jumps in preference at in…nity'.
Continuity : For any pair of sequences of contracts hc n i and hc 0 n i, that converge to c and c 0 , respectively, if c n % i c 0 n for all n, then c % i c 0
Finally, we require a minimum amount of non-degeneracy for the preferences with respect to the states in S. Formally, we require at least three states to be 'essential'.
